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INTRODUCTION 
In order to ease the study of the science of commercial law, 
the subject has been classified in four large universes: (1) persons, (2) 
objects of commerce, (3) legal instruments derived from business 
relations, and (4) administrative and jurisdictional procedures. The 
administrative procedures are held in front of administrative courts 
and the jurisdictional procedures in front of judicial courts. 
Within the universe of commercial relations, where persons 
and objects converge, all legal instruments are, and operate as, a 
support for commercial exchanges. An example of this is commercial 
contracts, which due to their nature are known in this universe as 
atypical contracts1. 
In the large world of business transactions, the central aspect 
that stands out is the commercial enterprise, that is, the “juridical 
person.” To ensure that enterprises may conduct their activity they 
require a “juridical personality,” which allows for the exercise of rights 
and fulfillment of obligations that lead us to the study of legitimation. 
The legal instruments most widely used by corporations are the 
atypical contracts. These legal instruments lead us to analyze the 
juridical person, taking into consideration that it implies another 
extensive field of study known as the “delimitation of competence of 
the parties” who participate in the contract, as generating entities of 
rights and duties, that revolves around legitimation of personality, 
which, at the same time, could be a point of dispute in business 
transactions. 
The problem about the legitimation of personality, 
notwithstanding that apparently accepted the terms juridical person 
and juridical personality, the scope of legal consequences for both, 
provoke incalculable and diverse conflicts (the lack of legitimation for 
act in name of a company, when the legal representative acts without 
authorization of the part involved) not only at domestic level, but also 
                                                 
1   Atypical contracts are those whose content has no control or the 
discipline does not exist in the legislation regarding to the relationship in private law 
between individuals who contract 
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at regional and global levels. This can be positive, in that it can enrich 
the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce and improve 
model laws that provide cross-border judicial support. However, this 
can also have a negative impact, giving rise  to large and spiraling 
expenses, when one of the parties must ask for consultant support 
because they do not know the language (procedural rules and 
regulations of the proceedings), in the administrative or judicial 
proceedings. 
To analyze the subject matter of this study, the “juridical 
person,” which has been a topic for discussion since the 19th century 
up to the 21st century, a consultation among authors including 
Bonnecase, Carnelutti, Savigny, Hans Kelsen, Nicolai Hartman, 
Ferrara, De Benito, Garcia Maynez, Rudolph Von Ihering, has been a 
strict scientific commitment, concluding with the personal 
contribution provided by Arcelia Quintana, has been updated. 
I.         PERSON 
A person is juridically classified in two groups: natural persons 
and juridical persons.2 The first group refers to a human being, who is 
an individual being capable of assuming obligations and capable of 
holding rights. The second group refers to those entities endowed with 
juridical personality who are usually known as a collective person,3 
social person,4 or legal entity. In this paper, the term “entity” will be 
often used when referring to this second group. 
II.         GENERAL CONCEPT 
                                                 
2   ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 270 (2d ed. 2004). 
3   The term collective legal entity is used by Francisco Carnelutti and it 
has been the subject of studies in various areas of general law. See FRANCISCO 
CARNELUTTI, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 153 (1955). 
4   See JOSE L. DE BENITO, THE LEGAL PERSONHOOD OF COMPANIES 
AND 32 (1955).  
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A.         Etymology. 
Beginning with an etymological understanding of “person,” we 
must reconcile the juridical fiction with what the law defines as a 
juridical person. 
The word “person” has multiple meanings.5 From an 
etymological sense this word is derived from personare,6 a term that 
denotes larva histrionalis, meaning “mask.” In this manner, the person 
acted as the mask covering the face of an actor who recited verses 
during a scene in a play because the purpose of the mask was to make 
the actor’s voice resonant and loud. Later, people used the term 
“person” in reference to the masked actor himself. In view of the 
above, it is quite understandable to associate the person as a natural 
being of the human species.7 
B.         Doctrine. 
The term “person” has been an important concept in the 
general scope of law, in civil matters. 
In order to determine what should be understood by “person,” 
diverse legal scholars have created varied studies attempting to clarify 
its origin. 
These studies described below express and analyze diverse 
positions developed by different legal scholars8 whose ideas have 
served as a model to identify the different trends of thought explaining 
the juridical person. In the intelligence that we exclusively expect to 
establish for science of commercial law effect, the relevant items that 
                                                 
5   See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 273 (Porrúa 31st 
ed. 1980). 
6   See id. (Aulo Gelio quoted by Garcia Maynez, determined through their 
glossological research that the origins of the word “person” are unclear but most 
likely derives from the word “pesonare”). 
7   ROYAL SPANISH ACADEMY, DICTIONARY OF SPANISH LANGUAGE, 
voice, person (Espasa, 1593). 
8   Among the authors who have devoted themselves to the study of the 
“person” are Francisco Ferrara, Hans Kelsen, Francisco Carnelutti, M.F.C. de 
Savigny, Joseph L. Benito, and Eduardo Garcia Maynez, whose works are reviewed 
in this paper. 
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allow us to specify on the commercial matter what we should 
understand by “legal entity” or “juridical person” as an entity capable 
of having obligations and rights. 
Francisco Carnelutti9 understands “person” in a triangular 
sense. He views the subject as the vertex in which the personal interest 
(economic element) and the subjective right (legal element) coincide in 
a legal relationship. 
 
For Carnelutti, the person is the “meeting point of these two 
elements, that is, the crux of the matter where both converge.”10 
Carnelutti clarifies that the juridical person is not only the man 
considered in his individuality. Instead, Carnelutti affirms that where 
collective interest exists, i.e. leading several men as one, unity is allowed 
to emerge, and personality as a unit will be acquired. 
The collective juridical person, as Carnelutti expresses, is 
created when the economic element and the juridical element of the 
relationship is the meeting point of more than one man, which is the 
fundamental principle of this unification of the collective interest. 
For Carnelutti, a juridical person is a natural or individual 
person as well as a collective or compound person,11 and both hold a 
common characteristic: they are the meeting point of the economic 
and juridical element. The latter differs from the fact that it is not a 
single individual in that position, instead it is two or more individuals 
who are united by a collective interest. 
                                                 
9   See FRANCISCO CARNELUTTI, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW 149 (1955). 
10   Id. 
11   Id. at 143. 
Legal subject 
(person) 
Personal Interest 
(economic element) 
Substantive Law 
(legal element) 
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Julien Bonnecase12 on the other hand, defines the juridical 
personality law as a set of rules and institutions that apply to the person 
itself, in its individuation and its power of action. For him, the 
personality law is classified in three parts: 
1. The existence and individuation of persons, which means 
the set of elements that allow on one hand social 
distinction of the person, and on the other hand, a 
determination of juridical effect. The elements that allow 
for further distinction are its name, its legal status, and its 
address. 
2. The legal capacity of natural persons and their variations: 
on one hand the guidelines of the organization in regard to 
capacity of natural persons and their variations (capacity to 
enjoy and exercise capacity with their limits), and on the 
other hand the study of the legal bodies which substitute 
for the incapacity of natural persons. 
3. The existence, individuation, and capacity of legal entities 
or juridical persons, which is the subject matter of this 
paper. 
M.F.C. de Savigny13 is the strongest proponent of the 
traditional theory, better known as the theory of fiction. 
From the analysis of Savigny’s proposed theories, it is 
understood that the legal entity is an artificially-created being, capable 
of having a patrimony, but distinguished by its lack of will. Savigny 
concludes that a “person” is any entity capable of having obligations 
and rights because the juridical persons are legal fictions, therefore they 
do not have free will and are not subjects of law. According to this 
trend of thought, the term “person” applies only to the human being 
                                                 
12   See 1 JULIEN BONNECASE, ELEMENTS OF CIVIL LAW 281 (Jose M. 
Cajica trans.,  1945). 
13   His book, Modern Roman Law System, elaborated on the foundations of 
his theory of fiction, which dominated from the mid-nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. See M.F.C. SAVIGNY, MODERN ROMAN LAW SYSTEM 304 (Jacinto Mesía 
& Manuel Poley trans., 2009). 
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because it holds the will to acquire rights and duties, and for the same 
reason, becomes a subject of law. 
Hans Kelsen14 argues that according to the traditional theory, 
a “subject of law” refers to the object of a legal obligation or subjective 
right. This is known as the juridical power to claim an action for the 
enforcement of an obligation. In view of this juridical power, the 
subject participates in the production of the court judgement 
considered as an individual norm that will rule on the enforcement of 
the penalty derived from that default. 
In sum, for Kelsen15 the natural person and the juridical person 
are merely a set of rights and obligations which, when taken together, 
are metaphorically expressed as the concept of “person.” In this way, 
the natural or juridical person as a holder has legal obligations and 
subjective rights which are metaphorically expressed in the concept of 
person, which is nothing more than the personification of that unity. 
Garcia Maynez16 defines a “person” as “any being capable of 
having powers and duties.” He maintains that juridical persons are 
classified as either natural persons or legal entities. While the first 
group refers to human beings as a subject of rights and obligations, the 
second group focuses on those associations endowed with personality 
such as unions or commercial corporations. Maynez prefers to 
distinguish between the two groups by using the terms “individual 
juridical person” and “collective juridical person”17 with the purpose 
of distinguish them.” In a moral or ethical sense, a “person” is a subject 
endowed with free will and reason, capable of establishing its own 
purposes freely as well as finding means to complete them. 
Maynez affirms from an ethical point of view, and in 
accordance with the thesis of the German philosopher Nicolai 
Hartmann,18 that a “person” is the subject whose conduct is able to 
                                                 
14   See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 178 (Robert J. Vernengo 
trans., 2000). 
15   Id. at 183. 
16   See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 21 (31st ed., 
1980). 
17   Id. 
18   Id. at 274-275. 
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express moral values. He clarifies that those values do not necessarily 
determine its conduct, in such a manner that ethically speaking, free 
will is one of the essential attributions of personality. 
The juridical meaning of a natural person is related with 
determination if the juridical personality is the necessary consequence 
of its quality as a human being; in a sense that the juridical personality 
of the individual does not derive from his human existence. 
In respect to the concept of legal entity, Maynez states that it 
should be viewed through the “theories of juridical personality of 
collective beings.”19 
 Theory of Fiction (Savigny). Savigny sustains that a person 
is any being capable of obligations and rights, and rights 
are only for beings who are endowed with will, therefore, 
the juridical subjectivity of collective persons is a result of 
this fiction, since such beings do not have a free will.20 
 Theory of Rights without Subject (Brinz). Brinz classifies 
the patrimony in two categories: personal and non-
personal, also known as patrimonies attached to a 
destination or purpose. In the first category they belong to 
a subject, while in the second category they do not have an 
owner, but their destination is addressed by a particular 
purpose and enjoys special legal guarantees. Here, although 
the rights exist, they do not belong to anyone but to 
something.21 
 Realist Theories. The realist theories affirm that private 
and public juridical persons are realities, therefore, the 
concept of subject of law is not limited to man, and does 
                                                 
19   Id. at 278-94. 
20   Id. at 278. 
21   Id. at 282–83 (stating that, “[t]he rights and obligations of collective 
persons are not, according to the Brinz thesis, the obligations and rights of a subject, 
but of its assets. The acts carried out by the former’s agents are not exactly those of 
the legal person but rather those of the agents that carry out the objectives and reach 
the goal toward which the assets are dedicated.  Despite this, all rights are, a fortiori, 
the legal power of someone and any obligation necessarily implies the existence of 
an obligee.”).  
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not exclusively refer to beings endowed with will. These 
theories also include the “organicism,”22 the collective soul 
theory,23 and the thesis of the social organism.24 
 Theory of Francisco Ferrara. For this author, the word 
“person” has three meanings: a biological sense, which is 
equal to a man; a philosophical sense, which is identified 
with a rational being capable of proposing and carrying out 
purposes; and the juridical sense which understands the 
person as a subject with rights and obligations.25 
Specifically for this juridical sense Ferrara states that it is a 
way things are, because behind the person there is not any 
other thing but associations and corporate organizations.26 
Maynez27 expressed a critique to Ferrara’s ideas, stating that the 
recognition of juridical personality by the substantive law does not 
have constitutive effectiveness. That is to say, the juridical person is 
not born at the discretion of the legislator, the only thing the legislator 
does is to recognize its existence. 
The diversity of the approaches around the concept of person 
make it necessary to contemplate the following comparative table to 
clearly understand the concept: 
                                                 
22   Id. at 287 (organicism is based on the notion that “collective entities 
are real entities compared to the human individual.”). 
23   According to this school of thought, in every society there exists a soul 
or collective spirit that is different than the individual souls of those who make up 
the group, which is why it is not problematic that collective legal entities coexist 
alongside physical persons. 
24   Id. at 287 (The chief proponent of the theory of social organism is Otto 
Gierke, who says that “the collective person is not like a third party compared to its 
members, it is the organic link that binds them together, from which stems the 
possibility of connecting the rights of the unit and the whole. The corporative person 
is undoubtedly above, but not separate from, the collective group of persons who 
make it up; . . . it is an entity that is both unique and collective.”). 
25   Id. at 288. 
26   See FRANCISCO FERRARA, THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 342 (Eduardo 
Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929). 
27   See EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 294 (31st ed. 
1980). 
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Person Doctrinal Concept 
FRANCISCO 
CARNELUTTI 
Is the meeting point between the economic 
element and the juridical element. 
M.F.C. DE 
SAVIGNY 
Person is any being capable of obligations 
and rights, who is endowed with will. 
HANS KELSEN The object of a legal obligation or 
subjective right. 
EDUARDO 
GARCÍA 
MÁYNEZ 
Any being capable of having powers and 
duties. 
EDUARDO 
GARCÍA 
MÁYNEZ 
As a subject with rights and obligations. 
 
In this study, the first authors are from the classical theory and 
the last authors are from modern theory, demonstrating that the theory 
itself has not changed. Thus, the comparative analysis of classical 
theory and modern theory becomes more explicit. 
III.        ELEMENTS THAT SHAPE THE LEGAL ENTITY 
As the concept of “person” has been analyzed in its 
etymological sense and by the main exponents of the doctrine, it is 
now necessary to study the elements that contribute to the juridical 
person. 
A.         Doctrine 
As mentioned, for Kelsen both natural persons and legal 
entities hold physical rights and obligations. In principle, only the 
human being is considered a person, because it is exactly its conduct 
that may infer a right, comply with or fail an obligation. Both natural 
and juridical persons express conduct which is understood as the 
2015 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 4:1 
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content of juridical obligations and subjective rights that conform to 
this unity. 
In reference to the duties of the juridical person, its bylaws, as 
internal regulations, determine or constrain the conduct of the 
individual who-as a body of the same-fulfills or violates the obligation. 
This circumstance of non-fulfilment in the juridical person is known 
as the “fictitious attribution”28 which allows for the consideration of 
the legal entity as capable of being bound by obligations. 
As to the subjective rights of the juridical person, Kelsen 
believes that they are exercised by a body of administration contained 
in the bylaws, and shall be conferred to the legal entity according to 
the bylaws.29 According to this author, the bylaws acquire validity by 
means of a juridical transaction determined by state order. 
Finally, Kelsen30 defines the juridical personality of the legal 
entity, which means that the legal order provides obligations and rights 
and their content is the conduct of human beings who are the bodies 
or members of the corporation organized by its bylaws and may be 
described with advantages by means of a personification of the 
corporation´s charter. 
The elements of the legal entity deduced from the theory of 
Kelsen are the following: 
 The being or artificial person; 
 Conduct; 
 Legal capacity; 
 Subjective rights; 
 Obligations; 
                                                 
28   See HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 196 (Robert J. Vernengo 
trans., 2000). 
29   Id. at 191. 
30   Id. at 199. 
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 The will; and 
 Juridical personality. 
José L. De Benito,31 from his point of view, sets forth the 
following as “conditions” for the existence of a juridical or corporate 
person: 
 Plurality of individuals; 
 Cooperation; 
 Organization; 
 Exclusive patrimonial capacity; and 
 Corporate purpose. 
The elements of a juridical person defined by Carnelutti are as 
follows: 
 Legal capacity; 
 Juridical personality; 
 Economic element; and 
 Juridical element. 
B.         Personal opinion of the author 
 The elements that contribute to the formation of a legal 
person are the following: 
 Existence of a being or subject: A subject of law is any 
being capable to act as holder of powers, or liable with 
                                                 
31   Professor of the National Academy of Legislation and Jurisprudence 
of the National Association of Historians of the Spanish Science. De Benito refers 
to the personality not as an element of the legal person, but as the result of a 
combination of the five elements. For him, that personality is the recognition the 
person expresses in front of the public.  
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obligations in a juridical relationship. The term subject of 
law or juridical being alludes to an unspecified person in 
terms of strict law. 
 Will of the subject or being. The action of a subject with 
the intention of producing certain legal effects, and should 
be highlighted its importance for the law, since this will 
should be also expressed in an appropriate manner to 
produce legal consequences. 
 Subjective rights. This refers to the power of the juridical 
norms which is granted to express or omit certain conduct 
that ensures the judicial protection. 
 Juridical personality. This section requires a study to be 
discussed separately. 
 Obligations. The obligation is understood as the existing 
juridical bond between the demand of a subjective right by 
its holder and the duty to fulfill the conduct based on the 
norm that is imposed on the other subject who belongs to 
the relationship. 
 Economic interests. 
C.         Juridical personality. 
In the juridical field, the word personality has several meanings. 
It is often used to indicate the quality of a person to be considered as 
a center of juridical norms or as a subject of rights and obligations. 
For the purpose of taking part of juridical relationships, the 
legal entity needs the so-called personality as an element that 
individualizes the entity. It is helpful to distinguish the legal entity from 
a different subject of law with a will that may be found in a similar 
factual circumstance. 
1. Theories of personality - This study analyzes the most 
emblematic theories of personality that intended to explain personality 
in relation to business corporations, such as the patrimony 
appropriation theory, the theory of the apparent subject, the atomistic 
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theory of the state, the theory of fiction, the theory of the legal act, and 
the controversial theory of veil. 
We have mentioned that, except for the theory of the legal act 
which establishes the difference between “person” and “personality,” 
none of these theories explains what personality is, but analyze the 
juridical person in general. Even so, these theories have been described 
by authors such as Garcia Maynez32 and Cervantes Ahumad, among 
others, as “theories of personality” even when considering the juridical 
person itself rather than its personality. 
Finally, we should emphasize the exposure of the reference 
theories can be viewed through Franciscos Ferrara33 in his work 
“Theory of Legal Persons.” This author developed, in an objective and 
systematic way, the study of the doctrinal ideas now discussed, which 
in turn have been studied by several authors such as Garcia Maynez34, 
Mantilla Molina35 and Antonio Brunetti.36 
(1)   The patrimony appropriation theory. - This theory 
considers that there exists the same legal protection to one good and 
one person in a legal relationship than such created between patrimony 
and purpose. In this manner, the purpose receives rights and 
obligations, that is to say, a patrimony appropriated or earmarked for 
certain purpose. 
In this theory there are no elements to identify what personality 
is, even when intending to put on the same level one subject of law 
with a “purpose” with rights, understood as patrimony that is able to 
generate rights and obligations; however, an inert patrimony is not 
susceptible of creating de jure relationships. For such effects, a volitive 
being or person is required, whether it is natural or juridical, because 
juridical relationships presuppose the expression of a conduct that 
produces consequences of law. At the time one subject expresses or 
                                                 
32   EDUARDO G. MAYNEZ, INTRODUCTION TO LAW 278 (31st ed. 1980). 
33   It is worth mentioning that Ferrara is located, by temporality, very close 
to the time that such doctrinal positions were exposed. See FRANCISCO FERRARA, 
THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 122 (Eduardo Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929). 
34   MAYNEZ, supra note 32, at 274, 280, 293.  
35   ROBERTO L. MANTILLA MOLINA, COMMERCIAL LAW 207 (29th ed. 
2002)  
36   ANTONIO BRUNETTI, JOINT STOCK COMPANY 45 (1960). 
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personifies himself juridically, it is required that this subject has will 
because only in that way is it possible to produce consequences of law, 
which also allows individualization of the volitive subject in respect to 
other persons who intervene in those relationships. 
(2)   Theory of the apparent subject. - The theory of the 
apparent subject was developed by Rudolph Von Ihering,37 who argues 
that the law consists of two elements. One element is substantial, 
which resides in the practical end that produces utility or enjoyment of 
the things that have economic or moral value, and, the other element, 
formal, is only related to this aim as a means of enjoyment protection; 
so this author asserts: “the rights are interests juridically protected; the 
law is the legal certainty of enjoyment.”38 
For Ihering, only the natural person has personality because it 
is the sole recipient of the protected interests (the above mentioned), 
contrary to juridical persons who do not enjoy said prerogative. The 
juridical personality of legal entities is something that is not inherent 
to the quality of man because personality does not derive from the will 
of natural persons. 
Although the legal entity has its own legal interests, this does 
not mean that personality resides essentially in norms. This is because 
even when law is effectively “a set of substantive and adjective 
norms”39 used to regulate the life of man; these norms by themselves 
do not create personality, in contrast, they only recognize a situation 
can be useful as a factor of individualization for the volitive subject, 
even when this subject suffers a reduction in its capacity. 
(3)   Atomistic theory of the state. - This theory stems from 
the idea that the creation of the State is grounded in the conception of 
                                                 
37   Rudolf Von Ihering was born in Aurich, Germany in 1818. His legal 
training took place at the universities of Heidelberg, Munich, Göttingen, and Berlin. 
He served as a teacher in Basel, Rostok, Kiel, Gissen, Vienna, and Göttingen, where 
he died in 1892. His methodological points of view had a great impact on the field 
of historical legal research and the science of law in general. 
38   RUDOLF VON IHERING, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW 1033, 1040 
(1998). 
39   ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 6 (2d ed. 2004) (the 
law is “a set of substantive and procedural rules issued by the state and that govern, 
during the time in which they are in effect, members of a society in a given 
territory.”). 
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Ihering. This means that only men are a reality and are able to act, 
therefore, personality is an attribution for individuals only, not for the 
State. 
The juridical person in private law is conceived as a fact ruled 
by the legal order. A personality, then, is when the law recognizes the 
pursuit of a common purpose by a collection of individuals, as if the 
pursuit was done by a single person. This emerges when personality is 
linked with a situation of fact40 recognized by the juridical norm, as a 
factor of individualization of the volitive being, and it does not imply 
that a sole statement defines the personality, because the recognition 
of the norm is a requirement as well as the will of the being whose 
norm should be individualized. 
(4)   Theory of fiction. - Friedrich Karl Savigny41 supported 
the theory of fiction, which is considered the most disseminated and 
the oldest since it prevailed until the first half of the 19th century in 
Germany, and the middle of the 20th century in Italy and France42.In 
conformity with this stance, only man has capacity to be a holder of 
rights and obligations. 
The theory of fiction sets forth the idea that the juridical 
person or legal entity represents an exception to the principle that only 
the natural person has capacity to act as holder of rights and 
obligations. This is a result of a legal fiction that recognizes the artificial 
capacity for possession or ownership of property43 by a fictitious being. 
Savigny defines the juridical person as a subject of goods who 
was created artificially, by virtue of the fact that said being only 
develops his capacity or juridical personality within the limit of the 
domain of goods, which are the only means to reach the purposes it 
was created for. 
                                                 
40   The expression “situation of fact” is used in strict law way, understood 
as factual circumstance which necessarily produce legal consequences. 
41   Karl Friedrich Savigny (1779-1861) was born in Frankfurt, Germany. 
He studied at the University of Gitinga and University of Merburg, and was a 
professor of law in Universitu of Merburg, University of Landshut and at University 
of Berlin. He was a leader in the field of legal history.  
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The theory of fiction confuses personality with the capacity to 
act; likewise, this theory puts in the same level the natural persons, who 
are incapable juridically, with collective juridical persons. When 
considering that fictitious subjects of law and those affected by a capitis 
deminutio, are not able to personify themselves or express their will in 
juridical relationships by themselves, in consequence, they require a 
representative to exercise the personality – capacity to act – that law 
provides them in a fictitious manner. 
(5)   Theory of the legal act. - Ferrara,44 when referring to the 
juridical personality of the legal entity, argues that juridical personality 
is not a thing, but instead a way things are. The juridical personality is 
the organic vestment used by certain groups of men or establishments 
to introduce themselves in the life of law, it is the legal configuration 
certain groups of men assume in order to participate in commerce. The 
personality is a juridical seal that comes from the outside to 
superimpose on these phenomena of association and social order, 
which may facilitate, vary, or change the substratum of the substance 
subject to this juridical seal which is always a collectivity or a social 
organization. For this reason, there is not a substantial difference 
between corporations and non-recognized associations. Both have an 
identical substratum, and the recognition of personality does not have 
value other than granting to these pluralities of individuals´ variables, 
which are the most appropriate form of a juridical unit.45 
As derived from the theory subject matter of this section, the 
legal order does not create juridical person; it only recognizes them as 
individualized subjects with pre-existing rights and duties in the social 
reality. This legal recognition is the element that comes to construct its 
personality. 
Juridical personality is a juridical fiction due to juridical person 
exists by rule of law and it is necessary emphasizes it. It is necessary to 
understand the rights and duties applicable to the juridical person; as 
they are still the origin of legal disputes. 
(6)   Theory of veil. - This stance arises from the argument 
that it is possible to “penetrate” the legal entity raising its “formal veil” 
                                                 
44   See FRANCISCO FERRARA, THEORY OF LEGAL PERSONS 342 (Eduardo 
Shepherd & Maury trans., 1929). 
45   Id. 
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up. The theory covers the same in situations where a determined 
corporate form confers directly to partners the legal consequences 
from acts this entity executed to disregard it or set said legal entity 
aside, with the purpose that partners respond to corporate transactions 
they made with personal purposes under the protection of the 
corporate structure in question, causing a patrimonial detriment to 
third parties or evading legal prohibitions, that as a natural person, they 
could have not overcome. 
The legal scholar Rolf Serick is recognized as the pioneer in the 
systematization of the study based on the analysis of diverse court 
decisions. The theory of veil has its origin in United States law, having 
as a frame of reference the precedent of diverse judicial resolutions 
issued by United States courts, as well as opinions from different legal 
scholars. This trend of thought is known as the “theory of disregard” 
or doctrine of the “disregard of legal entity”. 
The argument supporting this theory begins from the “abuse” 
by partners of the juridical personality by commercial corporations 
when they use it as “screen” for a personal benefit. These partners hide 
behind “the veil” that covers them with a corporate structure, failing 
contractual obligations that infringe third parties interests and evading 
the law. 
Frederick James Powell is considered one of the most 
representative propenents of the theory of disregard in the United 
States. He has defined this theory as “the non-recognition of the 
juridical personality of a commercial corporation in a concrete case, 
which allows said legal entity to reach natural or juridical persons 
behind the same, including the underlying economic reality, in order 
to apply them the corresponding positive law for the concrete 
situation.”46 
In English law, Laurence Cecil Bartlett Gower47 classifies the 
cases in which partners are permitted to “prescind” from the legal 
personality of a commercial corporation into four categories: 1) cases 
related to tax matters; 2) cases of sole partner corporations; 3) cases in 
                                                 
46   Id. at 30 (citing Nicolas H. Oreggia). 
47   Id. at 21. 
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which corporations develop their activity with fraudulent purposes; 4) 
holdings and subsidiaries. 
On the other hand, when making a severe critique to the 
concept of juridical person, the supporters of the contractual theory 
assure there are not absolute and invariable concepts, and the juridical 
person should be subject to an examination; especially, if under its 
scope there is an abuse of the legal personality. 
Now then, the applicability of this theory has used the 
technique of disregard of a legal entity, which consists of setting aside 
the juridical personality of the being, penetrating in the personal 
substratum of the partners (shareholders), “raising the veil up” of the 
legal entity. 
In Mexican Positive law48, which also involves in an implied 
manner, the non-recognition of said personality, as an essential 
element of the legal entity which will cause to deny that commercial 
corporations are subjects or rights different to those granted to 
partners who gave rise to its foundation. 
The above would contradict the principle contained in Article 
2 of the Law of Commercial Corporations, which recognizes a 
personality in legal and illegal corporations, with the requirement for 
the latter to reveal themselves as such before third parties. 
As a conclusion, we may affirm that juridical personality is 
conceived as a “veil” that covers the legal entity, which may be raised 
up or uncovered in case of its abuse and use by the partners for their 
personal benefit in prejudice of third parties or to evade the 
applicability of legal provisions, which, as individual persons would fail 
to observe, provided, however, that making use of said person and its 
personality they do overcome such obstacles for their personal benefit. 
                                                 
48   The theory of the abuse of the juridical personality, the theory of the 
underestimation of the personality, the raising up of the veil (to mention only some 
of the names given to this theory). 
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2. Requirements for the legal personality. - The requirements that 
help to construct or concrete the legal personality, and, at the same 
time, establish its juridical concept are the following: 
First of all, the patrimony appropriation theory, the theory of 
the apparent subject, the atomist theory of the State and the theory of 
fiction identify personality as something innate to man, therefore they 
use as synonyms the terms person and personality, even when there 
are different juridical figures. Likewise, they associate personality with 
will or capacity. For that reason, these theories affirm that only the 
natural person holds a real personality, since a human being exclusively 
has a will, the collective beings are only a fiction or an appearance. 
Different from the theories cited above, the theory of legal act 
recognizes the own will to the legal entity, and it also distinguishes 
person and personality. 
In order to produce the individualization of the subject of law, 
three requirements must be fulfilled. These refer in a certain manner 
to the real factor and the formal factor: 
1. The existence of a being or a subject of law. To specify the 
personality we require the existence of a being or a subject 
of law, a volitional entity considered legally real, that could 
be expressed in juridical relations. 
2. A situation of fact that individualizes it in the holdership 
of rights and the fulfillment of obligations. Juridical 
relations, who can be established as a result of a natural 
phenomenon, achieve this or the will externalized by that 
subject. In such a way that this one is situated or has a status 
which allows to differentiate it from the other volitive 
subjects; that is, it is legally individualized. 
3. The recognition of individualization by the normative legal 
order. This third requirement refers to legitimation49 of the 
                                                 
49   Legitimacy comes from –legitimo- that, in turn derives from the Latin 
legitimus (-a, um). In common language it means “under the rules”. In the legal 
literature, legitimus means, “according to law”, “fair”. For the Romans, “designate 
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volitive subject as a holder of determined rights or certain 
obligations in a juridical relationship. It is necessary that 
the being or volitive subject and the situation of fact are 
under a legal rule in order to individualize that person, that 
is, acquire a certain legal status. 
In conclusion, personality is established when a legal 
assumption is updated in reality as long as it is foreseen in a general 
norm of law that describes a determined situation of fact where the 
subject or undetermined person is, with the purpose to individualize it 
as a holder of determined rights or certain obligations in a specific 
juridical relationship. 
IV.         PERSONALITY IN THE COMMERCIAL LEGISLATION. 
In Mexican commercial legislation there is no precept that 
defines juridical personality, even when the term is also used by said 
legislation; especially in adjective or procedural aspects. Thus, the legal 
provisions that refer to the juridical person generally do it in function 
of the necessary quality that one person shall have to intervene in 
certain legal act or legal transaction of a commercial nature.50 
In other commercial laws,51 the term is used in reference to the 
fact that certain beings who belong to the State, in charge of regulating 
                                                 
something practiced or maintained as correct; produces a favorable reaction, 
approval.” 
50   Código de Comercio [CCo.], as amended, art. 391, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 17 de abril de 2012 (Mex.) (unless the otherwise agree, the assignor 
of goodwill will answer only for the legitimacy of the credit and for the personality 
from who made the assigment).  
51   Among these bodies of regulatory law are the Ley de Cámaras 
Empresariales y sus Confederaciones y del Código de Comercio [Law of Chambers 
of Commerce and their Confederations], as amended art. 4, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 30 de abril de 2009 (Mex.); Ley de la Casa de Moneda de México 
[Law of the Mint of Mexico], art. 2, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de 
enero de 1986 (Mex.); Ley Federal de Proteccion al Consumidor [LPC] [Federal 
Consumer Protection Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] 24 de diciembre 
de 1992 (Mex.); Ley General de Sociedades Mercantiles [LGSM] [General Law for 
Commercial Corporations], Diario Oficial de la Federacion [DO], 4 de agosto de 
1934 (Mex.). 
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several aspects of the commercial activity, have juridical personality of 
their own, without expressing what it means. 
The reference to personality cited in said legal systems is 
generally in a negative way, that is, it refers to the inexistence or loss 
of the same; it is a contrario sensu circumstance that allows to affirm that 
persons shall demonstrate the existence of that element to execute 
certain juridical acts. 
The adjective precepts of the Commercial Code52 that rule this 
juridical figure, do not provide a definition thereof; however, its 
meaning is understood when determining that judges shall examine ex 
officio the personality of the parties. They even foresee that litigants may 
challenge such of their counterpart, when it is considered that the 
plaintiff or defendant does not have the juridical quality he holds and 
appears in court. 
It is possible to conclude derived from the analysis above, 
related to several commercial provisions in which it is proven the 
concept of legal personality that we expressed as a personal opinion, it 
is the appropriate because such element holds a practical applicability. 
V.         THE PERSONALITY IN JURISPRUDENCE. 
The criteria that has been established in federal courts does not 
provide a clear concept of what personality is, because the courts are 
limited to produce the text of the law with some variations, when 
establishing that “personality is a matter that shall be examined in any 
status of a trial and even ex officio since it is the fundamental basis of 
the procedure.”53 
In reference to a commercial corporation that appears at a trial, 
it is necessary to show two personalities. First, from the juridical as a 
legal entity who is legitimated in the legal cause. Second, as the one 
from its representative, being understood that the latter shall prove it 
                                                 
52   Código de Comercio [CCo.], art. 1056–62 (regulating personhood and 
the legal capacity of the parties).  
 
53   See Jurisprudential Thesis II, Personhood: Its Study can be made in any Stage 
of Trial, Even Officiously, Semanario Judicial de la Federación 1917-1995 41.  
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has sufficient powers to act on behalf of the other, which should have 
been granted by the corporate body authorized for said purposes. The 
above has been considered by the jurisprudential criteria by the Second 
Courtroom of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.54 
However, there are other criteria55 in which the personality of 
a representative of a legal entity is still being considered as a derivation 
of its principal. 
Thus, the topic related to the personality of juridical persons is 
controversial in the field of jurisprudence, because there is not 
uniformity of criteria in the final judgements pronounced in that sense. 
VI.         ELEMENTS OF THE LEGAL ENTITY IN MEXICAN 
LEGISLATION 
The Political Constitution of the United Mexican States in its 
federal nature, in Articles 5, 13, 14, 16, 20 of sections V and IX, among 
others, use the term person to refer to natural persons and legal 
entities, and the Magna Carta considers them as subjects of law in 
generic hypothesis that rule said precepts. From such normative 
assumptions, it may be confirmed that the constitutional text alludes 
to those who are holders of constitutional individual guarantees that 
include the legal entity and the natural person as well. Afterwards, it is 
deduced that the principal element that recognizes to the juridical 
person is such of the subjective rights expressed as guarantees. 
On its part, the Federal Civil Code in the First Book known as 
“Book for Persons” includes natural persons in its First Title, in the 
Second Book includes the legal entities. This Law details that legal 
entities are the following: the Nation, the States and the Municipalities, 
the other corporations of public nature recognized by this Law, 
professional associations and others cited by Section XVI of Article 
123 of the Federal Constitution, the mutual cooperative companies, 
                                                 
54   See Jurisprudential Thesis, Personhood in the Labor Process, Requirements that 
Notarial Testimony must Satisfy Regarding Corporations, XII Federation Judicial Weekly 
and its Gazette 112 (2000). 
55   See Thesis 892, Personhood Derived Representation or Support, VI Semanario 
Judicial de la Federación 1917-1995 613.   
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those associations who are different to the above mentioned (natural 
person and legal entity or juridical person) that propose political, 
scientific, artistic, recreational purposes or any other legal purpose, as 
long as they are recognized by law, as well as foreign legal entities of a 
private nature. 
From the above we conclude in conformity to the provisions 
of the Federal Civil Code that rule the person subject matter of this 
study, the following elements are deducted: subjective rights, 
obligations and will.56 
The commercial legislation57 also refers to the natural person 
and the legal entity or juridical person, to qualify them as merchants, 
applying for such affects an objective and subjective criteria as to the 
first of them, and one formal for the second.58 
Now then, the qualification as merchant that is provided by the 
Commercial Code in respect to the juridical person, commercial 
corporation, is an effect related to its juridical personality as it happens 
in the Federal Labor Law that qualifies the worker to the individual 
that provides a personal service who is subordinated to another, 
whether it is a natural person or legal entity by means of the payment 
of a salary. Accordingly, the element that is deduced from the 
Commercial Code is the juridical personality of the legal entity that 
allows it to individualize itself as merchant. 
From the General Law of Commercial Corporations, the other 
element that is deduced is concerned with the will of the juridical 
person. However, this will is referred to the activities of the juridical 
                                                 
56   See section V.1 supra, the legal entity defined by doctrinal elements. 
57   Código de Comercio [CCo.], as amended, art. 391, Diario Oficial de la 
Federación [DO], 17 de abril de 2012 (Mex.). 
58   ARCELIA QUINTANA, COMMERCIAL LAW SCIENCE 258 (2d ed. 2004) 
(according to the subjective criterion, those who conduct themselves according to 
law are merchants, regardless of whether or not they have a fixed place of business. 
According to the objective criterion, merchants are persons with legal capacity to 
enter into contracts and bind a business, engage in commercial transactions, and 
make this their ordinary job. According to the formal criterion, merchants are the 
personas morales formed upon satisfaction of the requirements of commercial statutes 
or and other applicable laws). 
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person itself which are reflected in the juridical relationships that are 
established or created as a consequence of that conduct, from which 
necessarily gathers subject rights and obligations for the juridical 
person, as the case may be. 
The elements of the legal entity which come from the 
legislation are the juridical personality, the will, subjective rights and 
obligations referred to a being or subject, which are coincident with 
those detailed in the personal opinion. 
VII.        ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE. 
The legal entity as a subject of law has also been a topic for its 
reference in the different criteria issued by the tribunals of the 
federation. 
In this way, as provided in an isolated jurisprudential criteria, 
the Full Circuit Tribunals refer to the nature and to the juridical 
personality of the legal entity, considering that “a legal entity is a 
fictitious entity, whose juridical personality is expressed and exercised 
by means of its representatives; since due to its nature, the juridical 
persons need individuals, managers or administrators to represent 
them, to act in their behalf because fictions do not operate by 
themselves.”At the time of analyzing these criteria, we may deduct 
other elements of juridical persons: 
 One of them identifies the faculties or subjective rights of 
the juridical person;59 
 The other is considered as the will of the being of social 
will; and another are60 
                                                 
59   See Thesis, Directors, The Inherent Powers of a Trustee are Governed by the 
General Law of Business Corporations, XVI Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its 
Gazette 1237 (2002).  
60   See Thesis, Legal Representation and Corporate Manager, Differences Between 
Functional or Organic Representation and Mandates, XII Judicial Weekly of the Federation 
and its Gazette 759 (2001).  
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 Obligations of the legal entity.61 
From the above, we may also conclude that jurisprudence 
establishes the following elements of the legal entities: 
1. The existence of a juridical being. 
2. A will from said being which shall be foreseen in its bylaws 
contained in the incorporation deed and expressed in its 
representation bodies. 
3. The legal entity is holder of rights and susceptible of 
acquiring obligations, which the legal entity exercises and 
fulfills. 
4. It has a juridical personality of its own that distinguish the 
same from the partners who incorporate and convert it in 
a subject of law. 
VIII.        DEFINITION OF THE JURIDICAL PERSON OR LEGAL ENTITY 
FROM THE PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW 
A legal entity is a juridical construction that is given with the 
following five elements: the being or subject, its will, the subjective 
rights, the obligations and the juridical personality. 
In the specific case, the legal entity is individualized through 
the recognition of the juridical personality that allows the same to 
acquire the holdership of rights and being susceptible of obligations. 
In consequence, the conduct of a juridical person implies its 
will. The importance of the personality, in addition to individualizing 
the subject as holder of rights and obligations, is also that it is the 
suitable means to allow the legal entity to exteriorize itself juridically. 
The factual circumstance that individualizes the legal entity and 
the recognition made by the legal order is the essence that provides the 
legal entity with a juridical personality, since it is a factor of legal 
                                                 
61   See Thesis, General Managers, cases in Which They Lack Standing to Obtain 
an Amparo Remedy, III Judicial Weekly of the Federation and its Gazette 846 (1996). 
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exteriorization that distinguishes it from other subjects who also have 
a will and are capable of exercising rights and fulfilling obligations. 
From the ideas above expressed it is asserted that juridical 
personality is a creation of law, which function is to individualize the 
subjects with rights and obligations, granting them legitimacy in the 
ownership of said rights to exercise them, and fulfill its corresponding 
obligations. 
After we have established the arguments that support the 
present research, it is possible to assert that the juridical figure subject 
matter of the present study is not innate to the natural person, 
therefore, may be applied to legal entities, ideal beings for the real 
world, but real for the world of Law. 
In effect, in juridical persons concur the five elements: 
The first is related to the being or subject of law, that contrary 
to what we may think, it does not need a physical body to legally exist, 
and it is enough to have existence for the purpose of law. 
The second element is the will of the subject, which is detailed 
in its bylaws. 
The third and fourth elements, related to the subjective rights 
and obligations, are updated in the legal entity because the juridical 
person holds a will. However, there are cases in which it is not 
necessary the will in order to produce rights and obligations, since 
there are facts that determine it even if the volitive aspect concurs. 
As to the juridical personality, as the fifth element, we may 
establish that the juridical personality also requires the conjunction of 
diverse requirements for its conformation. One of the other 
requirements that help to concretize the juridical personality is the 
factual situation that individualizes that subject. This occurs when the 
legal entity adopts one of the corporate structures foreseen in the 
General Law of Commercial Corporations, which individualizes it as a 
determined commercial corporation. 
Besides, due to the recognition of those types of corporations 
in the legal order above cited, we obtain other of the elements 
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applicable to personality, which is the juridical recognition of such 
individualization, at the same time, as a result of the concurrence of 
said elements, the legal entity acquires a legitimate legal personality to 
consider it as holder of rights and obligations. 
In summary, we may conclude that, joining the five elements 
that shall be met to conform said person, this is defined in the 
following terms: 
The legal entity is a subject of an abstract existence, legally 
constructed with a will of its own, including rights, obligations and a 
juridical personality that individualizes it in the relationships of law and 
make it a center that generates rights and obligations of an economic, 
financial and commercial nature. 
Following the order of ideas set out above, the legal personality 
is also susceptible to having a concept which will allow it to distinguish 
this from the legal entity. 
Personality is the individualization of the juridical person by 
means of a factual situation in which it is placed, foreseen by a legal 
norm that allows personality to distinguish it from other volitive beings 
in the commercial-legal relationships in an environment of law where 
the concrete case develops. 
 
